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Raiders of the Lost Art: Strategy-Making  
in Europe 
Sven Biscop 
Have  Europeans  lost  the  art  of  making 
grand  strategy?  In  a  reflection  process 
initiated  by  Sweden,  Poland,  Italy  and 
Spain, they are invited to rediscover it and 
draft  a  “European  Global  Strategy”.  This 
policy brief argues that what the EU needs 
most is a short set of priorities for collective 
action, to be reassessed for each term of the 
High Representative. 
NECESSITY: THE EU NEEDS STRATEGY  
The European Union may well avoid debating 
strategy, but as a foreign policy actor it cannot 
avoid doing strategy in the real world, like it or 
not. Confronted with the Arab Spring, to name 
but  the  most  obvious  example,  the  EU  must 
choose a course of action. Even a choice for 
inaction still is strategic behaviour: a policy choice 
with long-term effects on the values and vital 
interests  of  the  policy-maker.  Strategic 
behaviour can be improvised – but its effects 
are  more  likely  to  be  positive  if  the  policy-
maker  debates  and  decides  on  strategy 
beforehand.  
 
As  Colin  Gray  points  out,  “The  only 
difference  between  having  and  not  having  an 
explicit  grand  strategy,  lies  in  the  degree  of 
cohesion of official behaviours and, naturally as 
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What  is  strategy?  Strategy  is  a  tool a t  t h e  
service  of  policy-making.  Starting  from  the 
fundamental  values  of  the  policy-maker  and 
the interests that are vital to upholding those 
values,  strategy  defines  (1)  the  priority  long-
term objectives to be achieved, (2) the types of 
instruments to be applied to that end, and (3) 
the means to be allocated. The result is a long-
term reference framework for short-term, day-
to-day policy-making in a rapidly evolving and 




Why is strategy useful? Of course, foreign 
policy  to  a  large  extent  means  reacting  to 
events.  But  a  well-defined  set  of  priorities 
allows the policy-maker to asses which events 
are more important to deal with than others 
and to deal with them rapidly, as well as to 
deal with issues proactively in order to shape 
the  environment  and  prevent  (more) 
undesirable  events.  Should  the  EU  passively 
watch the Arab Spring unfold e.g.? Or should 
it,  discreetly  but  actively,  try  to  steer  its 
outcome in a direction that is compatible with 
its  interests?  The  opportunities  are  there,  as 
President  Morsi’s  international  positioning 
shows: surely there are shared foreign policy 
objectives with Egypt.  
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Yes,  Europe’s  leadership  has  to  focus  on 
resolving the economic and financial crisis. But 
the more limited the means, the more crucial it 
is to prioritize and make sure that the means 
the policy-maker does have are put to use in 
the  most  relevant  way.  “Gentlemen,  we  have 
run out of money. It’s time to start thinking”, 
to quote Sir Winston Churchill (who else).
3  
 
Does  the  existing  European  Security 
Strategy (ESS), adopted in 2003, do all of this? 
No. The ESS tells us how to do things, but not 
what to do. It mostly concerns the instruments: 
the ESS codifies the (important!) choice for a 
preventive,  holistic  or  comprehensive,  and 
multilateral way of doing foreign policy. But to 
achieve which specific priority objectives? The 
ESS itself does not provide those, nor has it 
been used as a basis to develop them. So the 
argument to review the ESS is not that it is not 
viable.  Quite  the  contrary:  the  choice  for  a 
preventive,  holistic  and  multilateral  foreign 
policy  is  the  right  one.  But  the  choice  of 
instruments should not be confused with the 
choice of objectives: doing things the right way 
is  insufficient  if  one  doesn’t  know  why  one 
does them. The reason why the EU needs more 
strategy is that the ESS is incomplete. The ESS 
definitely is a milestone in European strategic 
thinking, but it should not be its terminus.  
 
For in the absence of clear priorities, the EU 
rarely takes to the initiative on the key foreign 
policy  issues  of  the  moment  (contrary  to  the 
other  great  powers)  or,  when  it  does,  its 
initiatives  tend  to  be  fragmented  and  stove-
piped. Consequently, it is not very successful in 
prevention, despite its rhetoric, and to what it 
has not been able to prevent, it tends to reacts 
late. Furthermore, the allocation of the means 
bears  no  relation  to  any  prioritization  of 
objectives. As a result the generation of means 
has  not  been  stepped  up  where  necessary, 
notably in the military field.  
 
The Lisbon Treaty has greatly enhanced the 
foreign  policy  machinery  of  the  EU,  by 
strengthening  the  position  of  the  High 
Representative  and  creating  the  European 
External  Action  Service  (EEAS).  A  more 
complete strategy would help that machinery 
to  overcome  some  of  the  deficits  of  EU 
foreign policy and live up to its full potential. 
Strategy has a multiplier effect.  
 
SCOPE:  THE  EU  NEEDS  A  GRAND 
STRATEGY 
In addition to the ESS, the EU does also have 
some  excellent  strategies  for  specific  regions 
and issues, such as the strategy for the Sahel. 
But the debate today should focus on a more 
global level: that of grand strategy, i.e. a strategy 
for foreign policy or external action as a whole.  
 
Without an encompassing grand strategy in 
which to anchor them, conflicts will inevitably 
arise  between  the  various  partial  strategies, 
perfect though each in itself may be. How e.g. 
to reconcile the Sahel strategy’s emphasis on 
security  cooperation  with  Algeria  to  stabilize 
the  region  with  the  same  country’s 
imperviousness to the human rights objectives 
of  that  other  partial  strategy,  the  European 
Neighbourhood  Policy  (ENP)?  If  the  EU 
operates at the level of partial strategies only, 
such  questions  cannot  be  resolved,  for  the 
answer requires choices to be made at a higher 
level: grand strategy.  
 
Without grand strategy, how is the EU to 
react to events that affect several of its partial 
strategies,  or  even  all  of  them,  as  major 
geopolitical  developments  such  as  the  Arab 
Spring,  the  pivot  of  American  strategic 
engagement to the Asia-Pacific region, and the 
financial crisis do? Their implications need to 
be discussed within each partial strategy, but 
they  may  require  a  reprioritization  of  partial 
strategies, and a reallocation of means between 
them, which is a choice at the grand strategic 
level.  
 
Grand  strategy  inherently  has  a  broad 
scope.  Diplomacy,  defence,  trade,   3 
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development,  etc.  are  all  indispensable 
dimensions.  Grand  strategy  should  not  be 
bound by any existing organizational chart. In 
fact,  ideally  it  would  steer  the  division  of 
responsibilities (and should inform the review 
and, as required, reorganization of the EEAS 
starting in 2013). But the responsibilities of the 
High Representative / Vice-President of 
the Commission can provide focus. The 
core  of  an  EU  grand  strategy  will  be 
within  her  remit,  and  for  those 
dimensions  where  it  is  not  she  is 
excellently placed to coordinate with her 
fellow Commissioners.  
 
The existing ESS actually is a grand strategy, 
or at least it operates at that level. Contrary to 
what its title suggests, security and defence are 
in fact the least developed dimensions of the 
ESS, on which it remains much vaguer than on 
a comprehensive neighbourhood policy and on 
effective multilateralism, among others. Hence 
any new incarnation of the ESS should have a 
new title that reflects this broad scope, such as 
a European Global Strategy.
4 In substance any new 
grand strategy would thus de facto replace the 
ESS, though it would not necessarily take the 
same form.  
 
Indeed,  ever  since  the  failed  attempt  to 
revise the ESS in 2008 (which produced only a 
report  about  its  implementation)  the  official 
debate has focused far too much on form and 
process,  to  the  detriment  of  substance. 
Debating  in  what  form  a  strategy  will  be 
enacted is a pointless exercise though, as long 
as  the  substance  of  that  strategy  remains 
undecided.  
 
SUBSTANCE: THE EU HAS INTERESTS   
EU foreign policy must be preventive, holistic 
and multilateral, because this approach reflects 
the core values on which the EU itself and all of 
its domestic policies are based. The underlying 
idea of external and internal action is the same: 
equality.
5  Peace  and  stability  reign  where 
governments  provide  the  greatest  number  of 
their citizens with the greatest security, freedom 
and prosperity. The combination of democracy, 
capitalism  and  strong  government  has 
succeeded  in  making  the  EU  the  most  equal 
region on the planet, and is the key factor in 
engendering a “feeling of solidarity and sense 
of belonging in Europe”.
6  
 
Within the EU, the fundamental purpose of the 
policy-maker  is  to  preserve  and  deepen  that 
social model, those core values, until everyone 
in every Member State is included. Outside the 
EU,  stimulating  governments  (through 
partnership  and  multilateralism)  to  equally 
provide  for  their  citizens  (holistically,  i.e.  qua 
security,  freedom  and  democracy,  and 
prosperity) is the best route to peace within and 
between  third  States,  and  thus  to  (prevent 
threats to) the security of Europe. The subtitle 
of the ESS sums it up very well: A Secure Europe 
in a Better World.
7  
 
This  approach  constitutes  the  core  of  the 
ESS and should remain at the core of any grand 
strategy  because,  quite  simply,  it  works. 
Empirical evidence shows that even countries 
that overall are poorer but where citizens are 
more  equal  will  be  more  stable,  healthier 
societies, than richer but less equal countries.
8 
The Arab Spring has demonstrated that where 
inequality  becomes  too  great,  revolt,  long 
though  it  may  take,  inevitably  follows. T h e  
aspiration to equal access to the political arena, 
to  prosperity  and  to  physical  security  is 
universal.  
 
Furthermore, in this way EU grand strategy 
pursues a fundamentally positive agenda, which 
is  in  the  mutual  interest  of  EU  citizens  and 
citizens of other countries. There are no direct 
threats to Europe’s territory today, and the EU 
“The more limited the means, the 
more crucial it is to prioritize”   4 
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should not seek to invent or provoke them. A 
threat-based  agenda  will  produce  a  reactive, 
defensive or even antagonistic foreign policy. A 
positive agenda on the other hand will stimulate 
initiative,  transparency  and  partnership  in 
dealing with the complex global challenges that the 
EU does face.  
 
Pursuing  a  positive  agenda  does  not  mean 
ignoring interests however. One of the causes of 
the absence of initiative and prioritization in EU 
foreign  policy  is  the  reluctance  to  discuss 
interests. But the EU’s social model cannot be 
preserved,  which  is  the  Union’s  fundamental 
purpose,  if  certain  conditions  are  not  fulfilled. 
These  conditions  constitute  the  Union’s  vital 
interests: defence against any military threat to 
the  territory  of  the  Union;  open  lines  of 
communication  and  trade;  a  secure  supply  of 
energy  and  other  vital  natural  resources;  a 
sustainable environment; manageable migration 
flows; the maintenance of international law and 
universally  agreed  rights;  preserving  the 
autonomy of the decision-making of the EU and 
its Member States.  
 
Not  only  do  all  Member  States  share  the 
same  vital  interests;  no  Member  State  can  any 
longer preserve all of them on its own. What the 
preventive,  holistic  and  multilateral  approach 
assures  is  that  the  EU  can  safeguard  those 
interests  while  maximally  respecting  the 
legitimate interests of others. Vital interests are 
at  the  heart  of  grand  strategy:  they  must  be 
pursued – but that does not have to be a zero-
sum game.  
 
The EU’s vital interests as derived from its 
fundamental purpose will indeed be the key to 
deciding  the  priority  objectives  which  the 
instruments  of  the  preventive,  holistic  and 
multilateral  approach  are  to  achieve,  and  on 
which the means will be focused. Prioritizing is 
the point of strategizing. The aim of EU foreign 
policy is neither to replace the national foreign 
policies of the Member States, nor to compile a 
long  and  thus  useless  list  of  all  their  national 
foreign  policy  priorities,  nor  to  sum  up  all 
existing EU external policies.  
 
An EU grand strategy should prioritize 
those foreign policy issues that (1) are the 
most  important  for  all  Member  States 
because  they  most  directly  concern  the 
vital interests that they all share and (2) on 
which there is the greatest added value in 
collective  action  by  the  Union  and t h e  
Member  States.  The  result  should  be  a 
short list of priorities, not for all eternity, as 
a declaration of principle, but for the next 
five years, as a mandate for all of the EU 
institutions  –  as  an  agenda  for 
comprehensive action, now.  
 
Four priority issues then come to the fore 
on which it is most urgent to take the initiative 
and  try  to  shape  the  environment:  the  Arab 
Spring, the American pivot to the Asia-Pacific 
region, energy, and climate change.  
 
MORE  SUBSTANCE:  THE  EU  HAS 
PRIORITIES  
(1) The Arab Spring. The EU had an elaborate 
strategy  for  its  southern  periphery:  the 
European  Neighbourhood  Policy  (ENP)  and 
the Union for the Mediterranean – it just never 
implemented  it.  Instead  of  promoting  more 
equal  access  to  security,  prosperity  and 
freedom  as  a  way  to  durable  peace  and 
stability,  the  EU  went  for  the  semblance  of 
stability by supporting any regime, regardless 
of its domestic record, as long as it was willing 
to  help  the  Union  fight  terrorism  and  illegal 
migration and, for those concerned, to sell it 
energy.  
 
Now  the  EU’s  response  is  More  for  More, 
giving  extra  support  to  those  embarking  on 
reforms. But after the major shock of the Arab 
Spring, taking a fresh start based on essentially 
the same strategy, in other words more of the 
same,  may  not  be  sufficient.  A  much  more 
fundamental  reassessment  of  strategy  is  in 
order, which has to look beyond the confines   5 
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of the ENP region: in many key dimensions the 
Maghreb, the Middle East, the Sahel, the Horn 
of Africa and the Gulf are interlinked. That does 
not  mean  that  all  of  these  regions  should  be 
included  in  the  ENP  –  that  would  be  neither 
practical nor desirable – but it does mean that 
the EU must seek flexible ways of working with 
varying  constellations  of  countries  in  different 
issue areas.  
 
Vital interests are obviously at stake, so the 
EU cannot afford to wait for the dust to settle. 
A proactive policy is of the essence, also because 
many  other  outside  actors  are  already  on  the 
ground, often with designs that run contrary to 
EU interests. The crucial challenge is to identify 
the emerging structural changes and long-term 
trends  resulting  from  the  Arab  Spring,  and  to 
decide which are to be encouraged and which 
are  to  be  avoided,  and  what  leverage  can  be 
brought to bear to that end.  
 
One thing should be self-evident in any case: 
after the failure of the ENP, the status quo is 
not  an  option.  Its  betrayal  of  its  own  foreign 
policy idea cost the EU its legitimacy with the 
people  of  the  region.  That  legitimacy,  without 
which EU leverage will remain limited (at least 
without  reverting  to  coercion),  can  only  be 
regained  by  a  policy  that  sincerely  promotes 
equality  in  terms  of  security,  prosperity  and 
freedom, and which produces visible effects in 
the near term. If not on its doorstep, then where 
does  the  EU  believe  its  positive  agenda  can 
come true?  
 
Elements  of  a  revised  strategy  for  the 
“broader  southern  neighbourhood”  include  a 
reallocation of EU financial means to this vital 
region, as well as stimulating relevant financial 
contributions  from  other  States  and 
international  organizations,  to  fund  a  major 
economic  stimulus  package.  If  clear  and 
effectively  enforced  conditions  are  attached, 
that  can  consolidate  democratization  and 
accelerate peaceful transition where it has yet 
to  happen.  Major  infrastructure  projects 
(notably  in  the  energy  and  transport  sector) 
can  stimulate  trade  and  trust  between 
neighbouring  countries  while  serving  EU 
interests.  Simultaneously,  shared  interests  on 
specific foreign and security policy issues can 
be the basis for effective partnership with the 
new regimes especially.  
 
(2)  The  American  pivot.  The  refocusing  of 
American strategy on the Asia-Pacific (and, not 
to be forgotten, the Gulf) and the concurrent 
expectation that Europeans deal with security 
problems  in  their  own  periphery,  imposes 
autonomy  upon  Europe.  The  immediate 
implication is that Europeans need to decide, 
collectively  (since  this  is  beyond  any 
single  State),  on  the  additional 
capabilities that they require. Any such 
decision  will  amount  to  guesswork 
though,  unless  it  is  grounded  in  the 
more fundamental decision on what it 
is Europeans actually want to do. Which are 
the  regions  and  types  of  contingencies  for 
which as a matter of priority they will assume 
responsibility,  based  on  their  vital  interests, 
and what is their level of ambition in exercising 
that responsibility? In other words, Europeans 
need  a  specific  strategy  for  security  and 
defence: an EU white book.  
 
That is not the same as a CSDP white book. 
The  question  is  which  role  Europeans, 
collectively,  see  for  themselves  as  security 
providers. Whether they act upon that and do 
operations through the command structure of 
the  CSDP,  NATO,  a  Member  State,  or  the 
UN, is an ad hoc decision, in function of the 
specific task at hand. It is the EU though, as a 
foreign policy actor, which decides the grand 
strategy which a white book is to serve, so the 
“The EU’s ambition should reach 
as far as its vital interests impose”   6 
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latter cannot be decided but by the EU as well.  
 
Capability development as steered by such a 
white  book  is  primarily  a  task  for  the  CSDP 
though:  only  by  Pooling  &  Sharing  among 
Europeans  can  the  Europeans  shortfalls  qua 
enablers  for  expeditionary  operations  be 
solved. A white book is a guide not only for 
capability  development  and  military 
contingency planning, but also for intelligence, 
monitoring and early warning, and should focus 
the EU’s comprehensive prevention efforts on 
the priority regions.  
 
Obviously,  the  neighbourhood  will  be 
priority  number  one  in  any  white  book.  But 
how far does the neighbourhood extend? Is it 
the  EU’s  ambition  e.g.  to  assure  peace  and 
stability in the Sahel? There are opportunities: 
in  a  region  where  the  actors  on  the  ground 
have  very  limited  assets,  deploying  just  one 
helicopter  squadron  can  make  a  substantial 
difference.
9  Or  does  the  region  for  which 
Europeans will assume responsibility end at the 
southern  border  of  Algeria  and  Libya?  Or  at 
the  Mediterranean  shore  even?  Iran  leads  to 
another important question: how does Europe 
see its role in case of conflict?  
 
The EU’s ambition should reach as far as its 
vital interests impose: as a global trade power, 
maritime  security  is  a  global  concern  for  the 
EU. The trade route that today is threatened in 
the  Gulf  of  Aden  might  as  well  be  cut 
somewhere in Asian waters. A fair contribution 
to  the  collective  security  system  of  the  UN 
seems another evident guiding line, notably the 
implementation  of  the  Responsibility  to 
Protect.  Agreement  on  priorities  should 
facilitate the mandating of action by the able 
and willing Member States, making use of the 
most appropriate EU, NATO, UN or national 
HQ, but in any case under the political aegis of 
the EU.  
 
(3) Energy and (4) climate change. Short of nuclear 
war, the potentially most destructive challenges, 
not just to Europe but to human progress as 
such, are energy scarcity and global warming. 
In Why the West Rules – For Now, Ian Morris 
argues  (most  convincingly  as  well  as  wittily) 
how  since  the  origins  of  mankind,  its 
development has been conditioned by nature 
and geography, and by its own technological 
progress.
10  When  development  hits  a 
technological ceiling, it does not just stagnate 
but recedes. Energy scarcity is precisely such a 
technological ceiling which it becomes urgent 
to break through, especially as in the wake of 
the  Fukushima  disaster,  relying  on  nuclear 
energy appears ever less desirable.  
 
While  global  actors  are  competing  for 
access to the remaining fossil fuels, finding the 
technological  solution  to  break  through  the 
ceiling need not be a zero-sum game. Indeed, 
if  the  breakthrough  is  not  realized,  all  great 
powers  will  be  equally  disastrously  affected, 
and  when  that  happens,  it  will  not  have 
mattered  much  whether  until  that  point 
Europe  or  China  controlled  the  last  fuel 
reserves. With regard to climate change, it is 
even  clearer  that  we  live  in  an  age  of  what 
Giovanni  Grevi
11  has  dubbed  interpolarity: 
multipolarity  goes  hand  in  hand  with 
interdependence between the poles, as no great 
power can solve global warming on its own.  
 
In  addition  to  domestic  policies  (notably 
qua  market  integration  and  research  and 
technology),  EU  foreign  policy  needs  to 
mitigate  the  short  term  effects,  e.g.  the 
dependence on external energy suppliers that 
limits  its  margin  of  manoeuver  (whereas  the 
US is seeking energy self-sufficiency), and the 
multiplier effect of climate change on tension 
and  conflict  within  and  between  States.  But 
EU  foreign  policy  also  needs  to  forge 
partnerships with all relevant actors to tackle 
the  fundamental  problems.  The  EU  notably 
needs  to  instrumentalize  its  strategic 
partnerships  in  function  of  specific  foreign 
policy  priorities  (thus  to  give  substance  to 
“effective multilateralism”).    7 
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PROCESS AND FORM: THE EU NEEDS A 
NARRATIVE  
If and when the Member States do agree on a 
set of priorities, i.e. on the substance of grand 
strategy,  the  challenge  is  implementation  – 
strategy  should  drive  action.  That  is  when 
questions of process and form come back into 
play.  
 
The first issue is how the strategic reflection 
itself is organized. The process should promote 
creativity and thinking out-of-the-box, brevity 
and  clarity,  and  ownership,  making  sure  that 
the priorities arrived at truly reflect the issues 
on which the Member States are willing to act 
and to mandate the EU institutions to take to 
the  initiative.  Thinking  out-of-the-box  means 
starting from a blank sheet, even though 
the  core  of  the  existing  ESS  is  to  be 
integrated in a new grand strategy, and 
usually  proves  difficult  within  the  formal 
institutions. Creativity and just that little extra 
bit of daring are more likely to manifest itself in 
a  specific  format,  a  series  of  seminars  that 
includes as representatives from Member States 
not just the foreign and defence ministries, but 
other  ministries  and  national  MPs  as  well  (a 
“mini-convention”  as  it  were),  alongside 
representatives from the European Parliament, 
the  President  of  the  European  Council,  the 
President  of  the  Commission,  and  the  High 
Representative – and, of course, the academic 
community and civil society. Incisive discussion 
notes should provoke a profound debate.  
 
The  outcome  of  the  process  is  not 
necessarily a document, or just one document. 
The aim is also to create the enduring awareness 
in the capitals as well as in Brussels that grand 
strategy exists and certain choices have to be 
made at that level, which should in turn create a 
certain suppleness in constantly reassessing the 
importance  of  interests  and  the  challenges  to 
them and re-prioritizing accordingly.  
 
Indeed, the aim is not to enshrine a set of 
priorities that is to remain valid for as long as 
possible and can be carved into the walls of 
the EEAS building (as some seem to interpret 
the  ESS)  –  that  is  the  opposite  of  strategy. 
While the analysis of interests and challenges 
preceding the setting of strategy obviously has 
to look at the longer term, its main aim is, once 
again, to decide upon an agenda for action for 
the short to medium term (up to 5 years), to 
guide  day-to-day  decision-making  and  the 
allocation of means (including in the context 
of  the  next  EU  budgetary  cycle).  To  make 
absolutely  sure  that  interests,  challenges  and 
priorities are reassessed at least every 5 years, it 
could be an obligation to update grand strategy 
during  each  term  of  office  of  each  High 
Representative.  
 
Strategy  does  not  end  with  setting 
objectives,  choosing  instruments,  and 
allocating  means  though.  Action  should  be 
followed by assessment of its effectiveness and 
reporting back, in order to complete the policy 
loop.  The  obligation  to  evaluate  policy  in 
function of the strategic priorities and regularly 
report back to the highest political level should 
ensure that those priorities continue to drive 
action. As a result of not providing for this, the 
ESS has lost its driving role, though it remains 
an important tool of public diplomacy.  
 
That  finally  leads  to  the  question  which 
usually overshadows the debate on substance: 
in  which  form  should  an  updated  grand 
strategy be codified? The EU must legitimize 
its foreign policy and sell its grand strategy, to 
its citizens and parliaments, first of all, and to 
the outside world – the clearer it is about its 
strategy, the more predictability and stability in 
our  external  relations.  That  does  require  a 
document, a strategic narrative, to be adopted 
by  the  European  Council.  That  document 
should  not  be  all-encompassing  though.  On 
the  one  hand,  the  Heads  of  State  and 
“Strategy should drive action”   8 
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Government  can  also  give  a  tasking  to  the 
relevant institutions to elaborate upon strategic 
priorities in more specific partial strategies. On 
the  other  hand,  certain  assumptions  can 
actually  remain  implicit  –  that  is  why  the 
reflection  process  is  important  in  itself.  The 
European  Council  need  not  try  to  spell  out 
Europe’s vital interests e.g., but it can stress the 
fact in itself that interests drive strategy.  
 
Such a document should be short and sharp, 
and  it  should  be  positively  toned  as  well  as 
ambitious.  The  starting  point  should  not  be 
what Europe is scared of, the threats, but what 
Europe wants to achieve: the positive agenda 
inherent in the core foreign policy idea of the 
Union.  Drafting  such  a  document  should 
equally  take  place  outside  the  formal 
institutions,  as  was  the  case  for  the  original 
ESS. A small team representing the quartet of 
the Presidents of the European Council and the 
Commission, the High Representative, and the 
European  Parliament  should  do  the  job 
(providing  substantial  drafts  to  the  “mini-
convention” and producing a public outcome 
document).  The  European  Council  should 
make clear that any such document replaces the 
ESS  (unlike  the  2008  Report  on  its 
implementation, the status of which was never 
entirely clear).  
 
CONCLUSION  
Finally, it should be clear that a grand strategy 
is a mandate to the High Representative / Vice-
President  of  the  Commission,  as  the 
point(wo)man  in  the  making  of  EU  external 
action.  That  means  that  the  High 
Representative should initiate decision-making 
in  the  Foreign  Affairs  Council,  and  should 
initiate  action  by  the  EEAS  and  the 
Commission  on  the  set  priorities  –  and  it 
means  that  the  capitals  should  allow  the 
collective institutions that they have created to 
take that initiative.  
 
A  strategic  actor,  to  start  with,  requires  a 
strategy: it needs to know who it is and what it 
wants. It needs the economic means to pursue 
its  strategy.  But  probably  most  important  of 
all, it needs the will to act upon it.  
 
In  the  words  of  Colin  Gray  again:  “Just 
because  a  government  drafts  a  document 
which  proclaims  the  existence  of  a  grand 
strategy, or a ‘comprehensive approach’, there 
is  no  guarantee  that  the  baronies  of 
officialdom will behave cohesively, coherently, 
and  comprehensively.  Strategy,  grand  or 
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